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Executive Summary
Whether the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) needs to be reformed,
and if so how, is an important issue in the European policy debate.
A key question is whether the objective of the EU ETS is solely to bring down greenhouse
gas emissions at least cost, which it is achieving, or whether it is also intended to deliver a
price signal that induces low-carbon innovation, which it is not achieving at any significant
level. The European Union Emissions Trading Directive is not explicit about the latter
objective, giving those who argue either that reducing greenhouse gas emissions is the only
aim of the EU ETS, or that a reform of the system is therefore not necessary, a relatively
good opportunity to do so.
This policy paper argues that reforming the EU ETS is justified whether or not one be-
lieves that stimulating low-carbon innovation is one of its objectives. In particular, this
paper argues that a large part of the problem is that market agents believe there is an
excessive market imbalance and, consequently, the price of allowances (EUAs) will remain
low even when the European economy returns to growth. This arises because the regulator
(the European Commission) is unable to respond to downward price shocks by withdraw-
ing allowances.
The crucial point is to incorporate a responsiveness mechanism into the EU ETS so that it
would change the current perception of market agents that the price of EUAs can remain
low for long periods after unexpected price shocks. A responsiveness mechanism would
encourage regulated businesses to bank EUAs while the price is low.
To be effective, the mechanism would have to be based on a transparent system of rules for
determining when EUAs should be injected or withdrawn. The price trend over a given
time period would appear to be the most transparent and simple trigger for a withdrawal
or injection of EUAs. The mechanism is similar in spirit to Article 29(A) of the European
Union Emissions Trading Directive which enables the injection of EUAs when, for more
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than six consecutive months, the price of EUAs is higher than the average price during
the preceding two years. However, in the case described here, a change in price trend
triggers intervention. In particular, the mechanism would enable the withdrawal of EUAs,
when for a given period (that which is stipulated in the current Article may or may not
be the correct time period), the price trend is significantly lower than during a preceding
pre-determined time period.
Once a withdrawal or injection of EUAs has been triggered, the European Commission
would have to calculate the volume of EUAs to be withdrawn. This calculation should
be based on the time remaining in the current market phase, the number of EUAs that
remain to be auctioned, and future projected emissions.
If the mechanism described here is implemented, it could induce self-adjusting behaviour
by market agents. When the price of EUAs either persistently rises or falls over a given
time period (e.g. 6-12 months), businesses will expect an intervention in the market. In
particular, when there is a relatively higher rise in the price trend, businesses would face
a situation where they expect an injection of EUAs. So, for those businesses in possession
of an excess of EUAs, it would seem to be in their interest to sell; for those businesses
having a shortage of EUAs, it would seem to be in their interest to wait. When there is a
relatively large decreasing price trend, businesses would face a situation where they expect
withdrawal of EUAs. So, for those companies that are short of EUAs, it would seem to
be in their interest to buy; for those businesses having an excess of EUAs it would seem
to be in their interest to wait.
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1 Introduction
Whether the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) needs to be reformed
- and if so how - is an important issue in the European policy debate.
The debate about reform was prompted by a marked and persistent drop in the price of
allowances (EUAs) from e30 in January 2008 to e4.50 in July 2013. There is a broad con-
sensus that the weak price of EUAs has been caused by a number of factors: the economic
recession; the overlap with other policies, such as renewable energy and energy efficiency
policies; a pronounced short-termism;1 and general uncertainty about long-term emission
targets within the European Union and internationally (Aldy & Stavins, 2012; Neuhoff et
al., 2012; Egenhofer et al., 2012; Van den Bergh et al., 2013; Piris-Cabezas & Lubowski,
2013).
There appears to be much less consensus about whether the current low price is per se a
problem that warrants regulatory reform (CEPS, 2013; Grosjean et al., 2013; Verdonk et
al., 2013). Differences of opinion about this point usually originate from different percep-
tions about the implicit objectives of the EU ETS. For some, the EU ETS was established
purely to reduce greenhouse gas emissions at least cost (Goulder, 2013, and references
therein). Others expected the EU ETS to not only deliver greenhouse gas emission reduc-
tions, but also to provide a price signal that induces technological innovation (for example,
see the Ministerial call for ambitious and immediate low-carbon action by the European
Union; EC, 2013).
There is an ongoing debate about whether stimulating low-carbon investment is a stated
aim of the EU ETS (CEPS, 2013; Grosjean et al., 2013). This has made the debate about
its reform polarised and political, and distracted from the real issue: the lack of ‘respon-
siveness’ in the system. This policy paper argues that reforming the EU ETS is justified
whether or not one believes that stimulating low-carbon innovation is an objective of the
1‘Short-termism’ means an excessive short-term focus by some corporate leaders, investors, and ana-
lysts, combined with insufficient regard for long-term strategy. Such a view can undermine the market’s
credibility, and discourage long-term investments.
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EU ETS. In particular, the paper argues that a significant problem for the EU ETS is
market agents believing there is an excessive market imbalance, which means that the
price of EUAs will remain low even when the economy of the European Union returns
to growth. This arises because the regulator (the European Commission) is unable to
respond to unexpected downward price shocks by withdrawing EUAs.2
Intuition suggests that making the system more responsive to changes in economic cir-
cumstances has appeal. This is supported by research which shows that loosening the cap
when the price of EUAs is extremely high and tightening it when the price is extremely
low could lower the expected cost of achieving emission reduction targets.3
In an attempt to increase the price of EUAs and restore credibility in the EU ETS, the
European Parliament has passed a proposal to temporarily withhold, or ‘backload’, 900
million new EUAs from the system, instead releasing them into the market at an unspeci-
fied point before 2020. However, as analysis in this paper shows, backloading is insufficient
because although it will mean that EUAs will be scarcer in the short term, there is no im-
pact on the long-term market price expectation. Even a one-off measure that permanently
withdraws EUAs is insufficient because, although it will have an impact on the market
price expectation, and so the price of EUAs would rise, its one-time nature is limiting.
Structurally, such a measure still leaves the EU ETS vulnerable to unexpected economic
and technological shocks in the future. Hence, one-off measures treat the symptom of the
problem – weak price – rather than the cause – a lack of system responsiveness.
Currently, the European Commission cannot intervene in the EU ETS in response to
unforeseen economic or technological shocks in a way that alters market price expecta-
tion. There is a wide range of conceivable mechanisms that could achieve this. A supply
2The EU ETS has a provision for addressing excessive prices of EUAs; Article 29a of the European
Union Emissions Trading Directive, provides for the possibility of making more allowances available when
”for more than six consecutive months, the allowance price is more than three times the average price of
allowances during the two preceding years”.
3This relates to the academic literature that investigates price-quantity combinations (Weitzman, 1974;
Hepburn, 2006; Gruell & Taschini, 2011; Goulder & Schein, 2013).
6
management system that can inject and withdraw permits from the market, based on
an agreed set of rules, is appealing to a broad range of stakeholders because it would be
non-discretionary and would require minimal intervention in the market.
The crucial point about incorporating a responsiveness mechanism into the EU ETS is
that it would change the perception that the price of EUAs could remain low for long
periods after a severe change in the economic circumstances.4 This would encourage reg-
ulated businesses to bank EUAs when the price is low, and would have an upward effect
on the price. Using the 2008 economic recession as an example, had such a responsiveness
mechanism existed prior to the downturn, the latent threat that the European Commission
could have withdrawn EUAs in response to their rapidly falling price would have changed
market perceptions, encouraged banking of EUAs, mitigated the price collapse and caused
the EUA price to follow the economic recovery more closely, rather than stagnating as it
has done.
This paper gives an overview of how a responsiveness mechanism could work. It suggests
that a rules-based reserve management system could be designed using a double trigger:
a price-trend trigger indicating the timing of the intervention, and a volume-based trigger
indicating the magnitude of the intervention.
2 What is the issue, if there is an issue?
The low price of EUAs in the EU ETS is not necessarily a problem. In a cap-and-trade
system, the number of EUAs is, by design, highly inelastic in the short term, changing
only as a result of government policy decisions (for example, a one-off allowance removal).
With highly inelastic supply, shifts in demand can cause significant price changes. How-
ever, the ups and downs of the EUA price can play a beneficial role.
4Given the large uncertainties prevalent in carbon policy, we are suggesting a policy that is itself
contingent on other factors.
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During economic downturns, the demand for EUAs will fall, which also causes their price
to fall. The lower price is desirable because it softens the impact of the pollution regu-
lation on businesses during the difficult economic times. This is what happened in 2008:
the economic recession, coupled with overlapping policies,5 put downward pressure on the
demand for EUAs and, unsurprisingly, their price fell.
The current supply-demand imbalance in the EU ETS is expected to persist until the end
of the third trading period in 2020. Although rules allow EUAs to be banked for use
in future phases after 2020, the persistence of the low price even though many Member
States are undergoing economic growth again indicates that the market as a whole believes
that the system is significantly oversupplied even over the long term. Research by Piris-
Cabezas & Lubowski (2013) shows that, without intervention,6 the existing oversupply
of EUAs will be absorbed very slowly and so EUA prices will remain relatively low for
longer; not reaching a level comparable with the pre-2008 prices until 2018/2019. The
large oversupply has distorted the orderly functioning of the EU ETS so that, despite
economic growth within Europe since the 2008 crisis, there has been no upturn in the
price of EUAs. This is muting the incentive for businesses to reduce emissions.7 What
seems to be missing is the ability of the policy regulator to respond to unforeseen changes
in the economic circumstances8 that generate downward price pressure. Lack of system
responsiveness depresses demand to bank or purchase EUAs and, consequently, keeps their
price low.
5New energy efficiency or renewable obligations, as currently contemplated, are liable to affect future
allowance demand. Economic theory as well as recent experience shows that policy interactions can signif-
icantly reduce both the environmental effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of policies. This is particularly
important in the case of cap-and-trade (Lecuyer & Quirion, 2013).
6The analysis by Piris-Cabezas & Lubowski (2013) suggests that the market is currently behaving as
if the surplus will be absorbed very slowly, which is only consistent with a very high discount rate from
holding and banking allowances - given future post-2020 targets and assuming that information about
those future targets is absorbed incrementally over time.
7In other words, the inter-temporal efficiency of the system is undermined by the large oversupply.
8More generally, what seems to be missing is the ability of the policy regulator to respond to changes
in economic circumstances, technological advancement and complementary policies.
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3 The exam question: A rules-based ‘responsiveness’
mechanism
The European Commission has attempted to increase the price of EUAs by temporarily
withdrawing, or backloading, 900 million from the market. The EUAs will be released
back into the system at an unspecified date before 2020. The backloading proposal means
that EUAs will be scarcer in the short term, which some analysts predict will increase their
price by approximately 35 per cent to e6 by the end of 2014 (Thomson Reuters, 2014).
However, there will be relatively little impact on the long-term market price expectation,
so backloading alone will be insufficient to restore the proper functioning of the market.
Even if the backloaded EUAs were permanently withdrawn from the EU ETS, such one-
off measures leave the system vulnerable to future unexpected economic and technology
shocks. Hence, one-off measures address the symptoms of structural weakness - low EUA
prices - but not the cause: the perception of market participants that the price will remain
low due to oversupply and that the regulator cannot intervene to change the situation.
In order to change the perception of market participants, the system has to have – and
be known to have - the ability to respond to situations of significant oversupply. Article
29(A) of the European Union Emissions Trading Directive allows for the possibility for
the European Commission to respond when, for more than six consecutive months, the
EUA price is higher than the average price during the preceding two years, by injecting
new EUAs into the system. We propose the introduction of an article that is similar in
spirit and allows for the possibility of withdrawing EUAs. Figure 1 shows the impact that
such a responsiveness mechanism could have on the price of EUAs.
The inability of the EU ETS to respond to the downward price shock depresses the incen-
tive to bank or purchase EUAs. This is what we observe in Figure 1 from 2009 onwards.
EUA prices stay low until the oversupply is entirely absorbed by the system, as the purple
line shows. However, as soon as a responsiveness mechanism, as described here, is intro-
duced, the price of EUAs rises more quickly because of the combined effect of a withdrawal
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of EUAs and the increased incentive the mechanism creates for businesses to bank EUAs
while their price is low in anticipation of a possible withdrawal.9 The green line in Figure
1 shows this result.
Figure 1: Modeled EUA price from 2014 to 2020 with and without ‘responsiveness’
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Blue line – Historic EUA prices 2008 to 2013
Purple line – Simulated EUA prices 2013-2020 where there is no responsiveness
mechanism adopted (and no one-time permanent removal of permits)
Green line – Simulated EUA prices 2013-2020 where a responsiveness mechanism
is incorporated in 2013 (an exemplary withdrawal of allowances is made in 2014
and 2016)
Note* a similar simulation of EUA prices 2013-2020 ‘without responsiveness’
can be found in Piris- Cabezas & Lubowski (2013).
9It is important to note that market participants should have confidence that the desired interventions
will happen. A transparent, rules-based mechanism would maximise the confidence in an intervention.
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There are a number of options for the design of a responsiveness mechanism for the EU
ETS. A natural approach would be to index the emissions cap to an economic activity
indicator. Indexing will adjust the emission cap to changes in the economy and, ulti-
mately, make the cap respond to shocks. An indexed policy could be a better option than
a fixed cap policy if the post-shock cap can be adjusted properly,10 but that would require
an appropriate indicator. However, as Newell and Pizer (2008) pointed out, identifying
the proper economic activity indicator is a complex task: the indicator must capture the
direction and the right intensity of the shock.11 The identification of the proper (under-
or oversupply) indicator is crucial to the proper functioning of the mechanism.
Instead of indexing the cap to an economic indicator, we suggest a responsiveness mech-
anism such that the over- and undersupply of EUAs is controlled by the regulator in line
with a transparent set of rules.12 The rules would put in place a double trigger system,
whereby the price trend (trigger 1) is used to identify if and when EUAs need to be with-
drawn or injected from the system and a quantity-based trigger (trigger 2) determines
the magnitude of the withdrawal or injection. The responsiveness mechanism proposed
adjusts the supply of EUAs by depleting or replenishing a reserve, and can be therefore
referred to as a rules-based reserve management mechanism. We do not suggest rules that
generate price bounds based on administrative discretion, such as a price floor or a price
ceiling. Rather, we propose a trigger based on the daily rate of return over a past period
(e.g. 6-12 months).
10Unexpected fluctuations in economic activity and technology development can result in shifts of the
trajectory of expected least-cost emissions reduction over time. Adjustments are then required in order to
restore the optimality of the policy.
11Ellerman & Wang (2003) and Marschinski & Edenhofer (2010) show that the incentive for a lasting
transformation of the regulated sectors is not necessarily stronger if an economic indicator is applied (for
example, with an index or intensity target). Overall, their results suggest that indexed policies have
potentially only modest benefits.
12The Technical Appendix to this paper provides an analysis of market behavior with and without a
responsiveness mechanism. The analysis shows how market imbalances disrupt the orderly functioning of
the market for EUAs. Based on the analysis, the mechanism described here is intended as a cost-effective
and efficient means to reinstate the orderly functioning of the market.
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The mechanism could borrow from Article 29(A) which enables the injection of EUAs
when, for more than six consecutive months, the EUA price is higher than three times the
average price of EUAs during the preceding two years. We propose a similar rules-based
mechanism; however the change in trend triggers intervention. More precisely, the mecha-
nism would enable the withdrawal of EUAs when, for a specified period (that stipulated in
Article 29(A) may or may not be the correct time period), the price trend is significantly
lower than during a preceding and pre-determined reference time period.
The decision to intervene should be based on the price trend because:
• A price-trend trigger is the most transparent and simple indicator available.
• Regulated entities can try to exploit regulatory changes to their own advantage. A
price-trend trigger cannot be easily manipulated - in particular when the trend is
observed over a period of 6-12 months. A purely quantity-based trigger provides
firms with an incentive to distort investment decisions in order to signal high under-
or over-compliance and prepare the ground for more or fewer EUAs being released
for subsequent trading periods (Harstad & Eskeland, 2010).
Once a withdrawal or injection of EUAs has been triggered, the European Commission
would have to calculate the volume to be withdrawn. This calculation would be based on
the time remaining in the current market phase, the number of EUAs that remain to be
auctioned, and future projected emissions.13
If the responsiveness mechanism described here is implemented, it will induce self-adjusting
behaviour by market participants. When the price of EUAs either rises or falls over the
specified period more quickly than the reference period, businesses will expect an interven-
tion in the market (see dashed lines in Figure 2). In particular, when there is a relatively
big rise in the price trend, businesses would expect an injection of EUAs (see the blue line
13We show in the Technical Appendix that the price of EUAs can be decomposed into (i) the marginal
abatement cost and (ii) the market implied under- or over-compliance level. This last component is used
for the calculation of the volume of EUAs to be withdrawn from or injected into the system.
12
in Figure 2). So, for those businesses possessing an excess of EUAs, it would be in their
interest to sell in advance of the injection; for those businesses having a shortage of EUAs,
it would be in their interest to wait until the injection. When there is a relatively big fall
in the price trend, businesses would expect a withdrawal of EUAs (see red line in Figure
2). So, for those businesses having a shortage of EUAs, it would be in their interest to
buy in advance of the withdrawal; for those businesses possessing an excess of EUAs, it
would be in their interest to wait until the withdrawal.
Figure 2: First trigger of the responsiveness mechanism – price trends for intervention
Key
Dashed red line – scenario in which, for more than six consecutive months, the EUA
price trend is lower than three times the price trend of EUAs during the two preceding
years → withdrawal of EUAs
Dashed blue line - scenario in which, for more than six consecutive months, the EUA
price trend is higher than three times the price trend of EUAs during the two preceding
years → injection of EUAs
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These dynamics (i) determine the level of intervention (quantity of EUAs injected and
withdrawn); and (ii) significantly reduce the level of intervention required to change the
behaviour of market participants.
This behavior is likely to mean that the mechanism will trigger only when there are sig-
nificant and unforeseen price shocks. Stakeholders would therefore be reassured that such
a mechanism would not result in a highly interventionist approach by the European Com-
mission, but rather, injection or withdrawal of EUAs would happen only infrequently and
in exceptional circumstances.
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4 Conclusions and policy recommendations
• Reforming the EU ETS is necessary whether or not one believes that the system
should stimulate low-carbon innovation.
• Temporary and permanent one-off measures should be replaced by a mechanism that
allows the system to automatically respond to changes in economic circumstances,
technological advancement and complementary policies.
• We suggest a mechanistic response through which EUAs are withdrawn from or
injected into the market, based on a pre-specified set of rules. We call this system a
rules-based reserve management mechanism.
• We propose that the timing of an intervention should be dependent on price devel-
opment over a specified timeframe (e.g. 6-12 months). Such a design is preferable
to discretionary one-off measures because a trigger based on a price trend is trans-
parent, is simple to explain, and provides clarity for market participants.
• Once a withdrawal or injection of EUAs has been triggered, the European Commis-
sion would have to calculate the volume of EUAs to be withdrawn. This calculation
would be based on the time remaining in the current market phase, the number of
EUAs that remain to be auctioned, and future projected emissions.
• If a second objective of the EU ETS is to send a price signal that is strong enough
to promote innovation, the proposed rules-based reserve management mechanism
could be effectively used to enforce a price target zone. A price target zone would
depend on the combined objectives of reducing carbon emissions at the least cost
and promoting innovation. However, the European Commission would need to be
explicit about these objectives and how it prioritises them. Whether a price target
zone is desirable depends on these explicit objectives.
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Appendix
This paper considers an emissions trading system in a stochastic equilibrium model. The
model allows for a decomposition of the allowance price into a sum of two components: The
marginal cost of abatement and a distortion term. This last term represents the market
imbalance. We propose a policy that addresses the excessive market imbalance, mitigates
the distortionary effect the imbalance has on the EU ETS, and, ultimately, restores the
orderly functioning of the allowance (EUA) market.
We consider a continuum of atomistic traders (players) and a continuous time interval
[0, T ]. In an emissions constrained economy, at time T every player has to comply with
the regulations by offsetting her total emissions with EUAs.
Each player has a (subjective) expectation about her future emission and future EUA
positions, as well as about future price developments. Let the stochastic process Y =
(Yt)t∈[0,T ] incorporate all relevant decision variables; the process Y will be specified later
in the text. In order to account for the heterogeneity in the players’ market expectations,
we consider the following setup: for each player i we consider a filtered probability space(
Ω,F , (F it )t∈[0,T ],Qi
)
, where Ω is a non-empty set, F a σ-algebra on Ω and Qi is the
probability measure of player i. Both Ω and F are identical for all players. We define the
filtration (F it )t∈[0,T ] of F to be the natural filtration of the process Y under Qi. That is,
all players observe the same state Yt at time t. However, their assessment of the future
market development differ. This is what we realistically observe on every market. We
also consider an objective measure P on (Ω,F) and accordingly denote by (Ft)t∈[0,T ] the
natural filtration of Y under P. For any random variable x, we refer to EQi [x] as player
i’s projection of x or projected (value of) x. We denote by EQ
i
t the projection conditioned
on F it , i.e. EQ
i
t = E[·|F it ]. Accordingly, we denote by EPt the expectation conditioned on
Ft, i.e. Et = E[·|Ft].
We now consider the case where we draw a player i from a continuum of players. We for-
malise such a notion assuming a continuously distributed random variable that represents
the players. We refer to Figure 3 for a graphical representation of the “drawing” proce-
dure. Given any quantity zi for player i, we denote by z a random variable, a realisation
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of which is then given by zi. The realisation zi, however, might still be a random variable
on some probability space.
A Abatement and trading
For the ease of exposure, we assume that all players have identical abatement costs.14
Available abatement opportunities are deployed in ascending order of their (short-run)
marginal costs of use. So those with the lowest marginal costs are the first ones to be
deployed for abatement, and those with the highest marginal costs are the last to be
deployed for abatement. Let Πt represent the marginal cost of the cheapest available
means of abatement at time t ∈ [0, T ] and let the process (Πt)t∈[0,T ] evolve according to a
driftless diffusion:
dΠt = Gt(Πt)dWt, (1)
where (Wt)t∈[0,T ] is a standard Wiener process. Depending on the relative cost difference
between abatement and trading, every player i chooses at time t her instantaneous rate of
abatement, αit, and her instantaneous trading rate, β
i
t. By letting α
i
t take negative values,
we consider a profitable increase in dirty production. We interpret a positive (negative)
βit as selling (buying) a number of |βit| permits. The pair (αit, βit) is chosen at time t based
on player i’s perception of the state of the world EQit Yt; accordingly we assume the process
(αi, βi) = (αit, β
i
t)t∈[0,T ] to be progressively measurable with respect to (F it )t∈[0,T ].
B Player i’s net position
We abstract from the primary market (auction of allowances, EUAs) and concentrate
on the secondary market of EUAs. Let i be a random player and Q be some measure.
N i0 represents the initial endowment of EUAs of player i; ε
i
T represents total emissions
of player i over the period [0, T ]; and ϕiT represents the total influx of EUAs from the
primary market and free allocations for player i over the period [0, T ]. We define player
14This constitutes no limitation on the generality of the model since it can easily be shown that the
results hold accordingly if we consider a continuously distributed set of abatement costs.
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i’s net position at time t under the measure Q as:
Xit = N
i
0 + E
Q
t [ϕ
i
T − εiT ] +
∫ t
0
αis(X
i
s)− βis(Xis) ds.
We write:
Xt = N0 + EQt [ϕT − εT ] +
∫ t
0
αs(Xs)− βs(Xs) ds
for the random net position yielding the net positionXit of any particular player by drawing
i.
Xt
Draw Player−−−−−−−→ Xit Draw Path−−−−−−→ Xit(ω), ω ∈ Ω
Figure 3: Illustration of a game with continuously distributed players. Xt is a random variable
representing the level of over or undercompliance. By drawing a particular player i, we obtain
a path-valued random variable Xit , i.e. a stochastic process. By drawing an elementary event
ω ∈ Ω, we obtain an actual path of instantaneous over/undercompliance.
C Price formation
Fundamental to our model is the concept of continuously distributed offers to buy and sell
EUAs on the market. Consider a market place where participants can offer to buy and
sell a quantity of EUA at a specific bid, or asking price, respectively. Figure 4 shows the
quantity offered to sell or buy depending on the EUA price (Figure 2, left diagram). Now
fix some price level Pt and consider the different order sizes at some point in time. We can
then map each order size to the number of occurrences on the market place. A negative
number indicates an offer to buy; a positive number indicates an offer to sell. We hereby
obtain a representation of the distribution of bidder and asked quantities. We refer to the
diagram on the right of Figure 4 for a visualization of the number of orders as a function
of the order size. Given any order size, represented on the x-axis, the graphs visualize
the number of orders with that order size as a corresponding y-value. The blue and red
line represent such order size distributions for different EUA price levels. Furthermore we
can interpret the hereby obtained distribution as that of a random variable: by drawing a
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player from our set of participants at any given time, we also obtain the number of EUA
she offers to buy or sell at that time on the EUA market.
Notice that if the total number of EUAs offered is not equal to the total number of EUAs
requested, the market cannot be cleared: the demand of EUAs is larger (or lower) than
the supply of EUAs. By interpreting our distribution as that of a random variable we
show that the instantaneous over, or undersupply (for a given price level), is equal to
the median of our distribution. Consequently, the EUA price discovery under a market
clearing condition has to be such that this median vanishes.
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Figure 4: Visualisation of price formation for continuously distributed players. The EUA
price adjusts such that supply equals demand (left diagram). Continuous time setting with
continuously distributed trading offers (right diagram). The market-wide over/undersupply is
given by the median of the distribution of βt. The EUA price changes instantaneously until
the total over/ undersupply vanishes, i.e. the median of βt equals zero.
As described above, we assume that offers and requests on the EUA market are contin-
uously distributed. In other words we assume that the number of orders on the EUA
market at any given time is a continuous function of the order size. In order to explicitly
obtain an EUA price, let us now consider a player i with probability measure Qi. Her
perception of instantaneous market over, or undersupply, is given by the median
EQ
i
t βt(Pt).
Hence, player i assumes βt to be a continuously distributed random variable whose distri-
bution is the distribution of offered- and requested allowance mass. Notice that this is in
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line with the graph in Figure 3. The distribution of βt, however, depends on the allowance
price Pt. This allows for the price discovery to be accomplished by solving the market
clearing equation:
EQ
i
t βt(Pt) = 0 (2)
for Pt. Thus, the EUA price instantaneously adjusts such that the instantaneous supply
matches the instantaneous demand. We describe the price discovery via Equation (2) in
the following equilibrium model.
D Equilibrium
Let −i denote the players’ mass excluding i. We find that, given a particular pair of strate-
gies (α˜, β˜), the optimal stochastic control analysis yields player i’s appropriate response to
be equal to the pair (α˜, β˜). Thereby, we identify the equilibrium abatement and trading
strategies which yields an intuitive equilibrium EUA price dynamics. We define for some
net allowance position x as the instantaneous abatement and trading rates:
α˜t(x) =
−νx
(ν + %)(T − t) +
Pt −Πt
2(ν + %)
, (3)
β˜t(x) =
%x
(ν + %)(T − t) +
Pt −Πt
2(ν + %)
. (4)
Let us assume that −i’s instantaneous trading rate β−i is given by β−i = β˜. Player i’s
perception of the EUA price dynamics is based on the price discovery under the (time-
independent) measure Qi. In the eyes of player i, the EUA price adjusts such that the
Qi (perceived) demand equals the Qi (perceived) supply. Recalling that i is an atomistic
player and Xt is continuously distributed, we have EQ
i
t Xt = E
Qi
t X
−i
t . Thus, the instan-
taneous market clearing condition at time t implies EQ
i
t β
−i(X−it ) = 0. Consequently, we
obtain:
Pt = Πt − 2% E
Qi
t X
−i
t
T − t . (5)
This yields the Qi-dynamics:
dPt = dΠt +
2% dEQ
i
t [ε
−i
T − ϕ−iT ]
T − t . (6)
In order to obtain an arbitrage-free market we assume that both P and Π are Qi-
martingales. Clearly, this holds if, and only if, the second component in Equation (5)
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is a martingale. This assumption is quite natural: the Qi-dynamics of EQiX−it represent
player i’s belief about the future development of her own beliefs, which have to be driftless
– believing that my belief will change in the future in a certain direction makes no sense.
For simplicity, we add the assumption
Assumption 1. Let the measure Qi be such that dEQ
i
t [ε
j
T − ϕjT ] = 0, j ∈ {i,−i}.
In other words, player i does not update her beliefs on the difference εjT − ϕjT .
Player i’s optimisation problem. When considering trading on the EUA market we
include non-vanishing execution costs. Let ν > 0 be some parameter representing the
costs associated with a trading order (e.g. half the bid-ask spread). Thus, the monetary
amount paid or received when trading βit at time t corresponds to P˜t = Pt−νβit. Atomistic
players are price-takers on the EUA market.
Let us begin with the case where the compliance constraint, EQ
i
t XT = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ],
is satisfied. Player i seeks to maximize her profit-and-loss (P&L) over the period [0, T ].
Her P&L from trading over [0, T ] is given by P&L =
∫ T
0 Z
i
t dP˜t, where we denote by Z
i
t
the number of permits held by i at time t; i.e. dZit = −βit dt. This means that at each
point in time, the number of EUAs currently held by player i are multiplied by the change
in price. This yields the instantaneous profit gained or loss suffered. These instantaneous
changes in value are then integrated over [0, T ] to obtain the P&L. Then we have:
P&L =
∫ T
0
Zt dP˜t = ZiT P˜T − Zi0P˜0 +
∫ T
0
βitP˜t dt = Z
i
T P˜T − Zi0P˜0 +
∫ T
0
βitPt − ν(βit)2 dt.
Regarding the abatement strategy, we consider a quadratic influence of the abatement rate
αit on the total abatement costs. In other words, we assume that abatement costs increase
with successive increase in emission cleanup. It costs a lot more to clean up the last unit
of emission than the first. Let % > 0 and let player i’s optimisation problem consist in
finding abatement and trading strategies αi and βi, respectively, by maximizing the term:
EQ
i
0
[∫ T
0
Ptβ
i
t − ν(βit)2 −Πtαit − %(αit)2 dt
]
,
subject to the compliance constraint:
EQ
i
t X
i
T = 0, for all t ∈ [0, T ]. (7)
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Consequently, we define player i’s value function on [0, T )× R3 as:
w∗(t, pi, ψ, x) = sup
(α,β)
EQ
i
[∫ T
t
P t,ψ+pis βs − νβ2s −Πt,pis αs − %α2s ds
]
,
where ψ denotes the difference Pt − Πt, P t,ψ+pis denotes the process satisfying Equation
(6) with P t,ψ+pit = ψ + pi and Π
t,pi
s satisfies Equation (1) with Π
t,pi
t = pi. Correspondingly,
we consider the state process Y = (Yt)t∈[0,T ] with Yt = (Πt,Ψt, Xt).
Lemma 2. For α−i = α˜ and β−i = β˜, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for player
i’s problem of profit maximization is given by:
Dtw +
Gt(pi)2
2
D2piw +
1
4%
(Dxw − pi)2 + 14ν (ψ + pi −Dxw)
2 = 0 (8)
Furthermore, i’s optimal abatement- and trading strategies have to satisfy
αit =
Dxw −Πt
2%
(9)
and
βit =
Pt −Πt
2ν
− %
ν
αit. (10)
In order to meet the compliance constraint (7) we impose a terminal condition on w:
lim
t↗T
w(t, x) =

−∞ : x 6= 0
0 : x = 0.
(11)
Proposition 3. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Equation (8) with terminal condition (11)
is solved by
w(t, pi, ψ, x) =
(
pi +
%ψ
ν + %
)
x− ν%x
2
(v + %)(T − t) +
(T − t)ψ2
4(ν + %)
. (12)
The abatement and trading strategies α∗,i β∗,i obtained from Equation (12) using Equation
(9) and Equation (10) are given by
α∗,i = α˜, β∗,i = β˜.
Furthermore X∗,it , given α∗,i and β∗,i, satisfies the compliance constraint in Equation (7).
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This suggests to consider the equilibrium strategies:
{
αi,∗(Xit), β
i,∗(Xit)
}
i
=
{
α˜(Xit), β˜(X
i
t)
}
i
,
which confirm the Qi-perceived equilibrium price process:
Pt = Πt − 2% E
Qi
t Xt
T − t = Πt −
2%
T
EQ
i
t X0
with Qi-dynamics
dPt = dΠt.
E Implications
Notice that we obtain a similar decomposition also under the objective measure P:
Pt = Πt − 2% E
P
tXt
T − t . (13)
However, the EUA price P-dynamics:
dPt = dΠt +
2% dEPt [εT − ϕT ]
T − t , (14)
has a second component (the distortion term) which is not necessarily a martingale. Using
the decomposition in Equation (13) and recalling the definition of the expected under or
overcompliance Xt, we obtain the following corollaries:
Corollary 4. The market has a P-expected zero-net compliance position at time τ ∈ [0, T )
if and only if at time τ the allowance price equals the marginal cost of abatement.
The equilibrium price in Equation (13) aligns with the conventional result that the al-
lowance price equals the marginal abatement costs; in other words:
Corollary 5 (Steady State). For T → ∞, the allowance price Pt converges to the
marginal cost of abatement Πt.
The decomposition of Equation (13) is quite intuitive: market overcompliance, e.g. over-
compliance with respect to the mass of regulated entities, results in EUA prices below
the marginal abatement cost. Conversely, market undercompliance results in EUA prices
above the marginal abatement cost. The extent to which the EUA price is lower or higher
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than the marginal abatement cost depends on the market-wide excess imbalance. There-
fore, low EUA prices should be regarded as a symptom of a deeper problem rather than
the problem itself. We refer to the policy paper, chapter two, for a more comprehensive
discussion.
Using the decomposition in Equation (13) and the definition of the net compliance Xt, it
follows that the EUA price Pt can be decomposed into the sum of the marginal cost of
abatement Πt and a distortion term as follows:
Pt = Πt − 2%
T − t
[
N0 + EPt [ϕT − εT ] + EPt
[∫ t
0
αs(Xs)− βs(Xs) ds
]]
. (15)
Equation (15) corresponds to an expanded decomposition of the EUA price in Equation
(13) and contains all key components of the EUA price: initial EUA allocation N0, total
EUA allocation ϕT , total emissions εT , abatement and trading strategies, respectively.
The expanded decomposition in Equation (15) can be used to identify the possible driver
of an extremely low permit price. A large N0 indicates a (potentially excessive) initial
allocation of EUAs. With significantly large overallocation, the EUA price can remain
relatively low for some time (depending on the level of overallocation). Yet, the initial
endowment does not change the price behaviour, as illustrated by Equation (14). The
term EPt [ϕT − εT ] has a interesting interpretation too. Under a linear annual reduction
target – as it is implemented in the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS)
– ϕT is deterministic and, in particular, time- and economy-independent. Instead, EPt εT is
economy-dependent. Therefore, the term dEPt [εT − ϕT ] in the dynamics of Equation (14)
is non-vanishing. Hence, an excessive market imbalance determines low EUA prices and,
more importantly, a significant distortion in the permit price dynamics.
Excessive Imbalance – Let us focus on the distortion term in Equation (15). Recalling
the market clearing condition, EPt [βs(Xs)] = 0 for all s ∈ [0, T ], we obtain:
Pt = Πt − 2%
T − t
[
N0 + EPt [ϕT − εT ] + EPt
[∫ t
0
αs(Xs)
]]
. (16)
A vanishing distortion term occurs only when the abatement effort, EP
[∫ T
0 αs(Xs)ds
]
,
equals the offset emissions net of EUAs, −(N0 + EPt [ϕT − εT ]). Recall that negative αt
corresponds to negative abatement, emissions. When the required effort and the potential
abatement effort are far apart, the EUA price Pt diverges (perhaps significantly) from the
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marginal abatement cost Πt. Consider the ratio,
(N0+EPt [ϕT−εT ])
EP[
R T
0 αs(Xs)ds]
. An extremely large ratio
indicates that the market is excessively imbalanced. This occurs when (i) the required
offset effort is large and negative, and the (negative) abatement opportunities are very
limited; (ii) the required offset effort is large and positive, and the (positive) abatement
opportunities are very limited. In the first case the EUA price is lower than the marginal
abatement cost; in the second case it is larger than the marginal abatement cost.
Below we suggest a transparent and simple, rules-based programme designed to make the
EU ETS responsive, i.e. to respond to excessive market imbalance scenarios.
F Policy suggestion
We propose a double trigger intervention policy. The first trigger indicates the condition
under which there is an intervention and is based on an observed price-drift rule. The
second trigger indicates the magnitude of the intervention and is based on a quantity
rule derived from Equation (13). The intervention algorithm works as follows: at certain
revision dates {τk}k=1,...,n, the empirical price drifts µa and µb over the past periods
[τk−a, τk) and [τk−(a+b), τk−a) are estimated using historical daily rate of returns. The
length of the time windows, a and b, should be chosen with the trade-off between timely
action and potential manipulation in mind. We suggest the following time windows:
6-12 months for a and 24 months for b. Using the decomposition in Equation (14), a
significant change in the price trend, e.g. µa extremely larger or smaller than µb, indicates
a significant dEPt [εT ]. By abating and trading, players respond to variations in EPt [εT ].
However, when the required offset effort, relative to the potential abatement and trading
opportunities, are excessive, the EUA price will deviate from its steady state. Hence, we
have an excess market imbalance that requires regulator’s intervention. This is the first
trigger. The regulator’s intervention operates via ϕT : the availability of (future) EUAs
will be increased or reduced, depending on the sign of the imbalance; positive indicates
oversupply, and negative indicates undersupply. In particular, using the decomposition
in Equation (13), the instantaneous over, or undersupply, Xt determines the intervention
magnitude under the objective |Pτi − Πτi | → min for i = 1, ..., n and |dPt − dΠt| → min
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for t ∈ [0, T ]. This is the second, volume-based trigger.15
The mechanism described above induces an auto-correction effect. Suppose that, before
an EUA auction revision date τ, there has been a price trend significantly lower than the
price trend in the preceding two years. Anticipating the intervention, regulated entities’
perceived probability of the regulator’s intervention increases. Consider player i. She
will revise her expectations about future allocation, EQi [ϕT ]. The more transparent and
simple the intervention rules, the more immediate and exact the revised expectations
about the future EUA allocation. As indicated in Equation (6), by revising the future
EUA allocations the equilibrium price dynamics changes. Consequently, as indicated in
Equation (3) and Equation (4), player i will adjust her trading and abatement strategies.
Depending on the sign of the intervention, player i may decide to abate more and trade
less, or vice versa. It should be noted that the auto-correction reduces the magnitude
of the required intervention at τ. In fact, the more transparent and simple the rules are
about if to intervene and the level of intervention, the lower the regulator’s intervention
effort.
References
Adly, J., and Stavins, N., 2012. The promise and problems of pricing carbon: theory and
experience. Journal of Environment and Development, 21(2), pp.152-180.
Centre for European Policy Studies Carbon Market Forum, 2013. Submission to the Eu-
ropean Commission consultation on structural options to strengthen the European Union
Emissions Trading System. Working Paper. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.
Egenhofer, C., Marcu, A., and Georgiev, A., 2012. Reviewing the European Union Emis-
sions Trading System Review. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.
European Commission, 2012. The state of the European carbon market in 2012 - Report
from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Brussels: European
15The paper by Gru¨ll & Kiesel (2012) suggests an interesting approach to evaluate Xt.
26
Commission.
Gru¨ll, G., and Kiesel, R., 2012. Quantifying the CO2 Permit Price Sensitivity. Zeitschrift
fu¨r Energiewirtschaft, 36 (2), pp.101-111.
The Green Growth Group, 2013. Going for Green Growth: The case for ambitious and
immediate EU low carbon action. Brussels: The Green Growth Group.
Goulder L., 2013. Markets for pollution allowances: what are the (new) lessons? The
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27 (1), pp.87-102.
Goulder, L.H., and Schein, A., 2013. Carbon taxes vs. cap and trade: a critical review.
Working Paper No. 19338. National Bureau of Economic Research. Cambridge, USA:
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Grosjean, G., Acworth, W., Flachsland, C., and Marschinski, R., 2013. After monetary
policy, climate policy: is delegation the key to EU ETS reform? PIK Working Paper.
Potsdam: PIK.
Gruell, G. and Taschini, L., 2011. Cap-and-trade properties under different hybrid scheme
designs. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 61 (1), pp.107-118.
Harstad, B.,and Eskeland, S., 2010. Trading for the future: signalling in permit markets’,
Journal of Public Economics, 94(9–10), pp.749–760.
Jakob, M., and Brunner, S., 2011. Optimal commitment under uncertainty: adjustment
rules for climate policy. Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research working paper.
Potsdam: Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research.
Lecuyer, O., and Quirion, P., 2013. Can uncertainty justify overlapping policy instruments
to mitigate emissions? Ecological Economics, 93 (4), pp.177-191.
27
Neuhoff K., Schopp A., Boyd R., Stelmakh K., and Vasa A., 2012. Banking of surplus
emissions allowances - does the volume matter? DIW discussion papers No. 1193. Berlin:
German Institute for Economic Research.
Piris-Cabezas, P. and Lubowski, R., 2013. Increasing demand by raising long term ex-
pectations: the importance of a 2030 target for the European Union’s Climate Policy.
Washington DC: Environmental Defense Fund.
Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, 2014. EU ETS gets a confidence boost as backloading
approved. [press release] 10 December, 2013. Available at:
http://www.pointcarbon.com/aboutus/pressroom/pressreleases/1.3323754
Ulph, A. and Ulph, D., 2009. Optimal Climate Change Policies When Governments Can-
not Commit. Discussion Paper No. 0909, Department of Economics, University of St.
Andrews. St. Andrews, UK: University of St. Andrews
Verdonk, M., Brink, C., Vollebergh, H., and Roelfsema, M., 2013. Evaluation of policy
options to reform the EU Emissions Trading System: Effects on carbon price, emissions
and the economy. The Hague: PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency.
Van den Bergh, K., Delarue, E., and D’haeseleer, W., 2013. Impacts of renewables de-
ployment on the CO2 emissions in the European electricity sector. Energy Policy. [online]
available at:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421513009270#
28
